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Metadata-Based Detection of Child Sexual Abuse
Material
Mayana Pereira, Rahul Dodhia, and Richard Brown
Abstract—In the last decade, the scale of creation and dis-
tribution of child sexual abuse medias (CSAM) has exponen-
tially increased. Technologies that aid law enforcement agencies
worldwide to identify such crimes rapidly can potentially result
in the mitigation of child victimization, and the apprehending
of offenders. Machine learning presents the potential to help
law enforcement rapidly identify such material, and even block
such content from being distributed digitally. However, collecting
and storing CSAM files to train machine learning models has
many ethical and legal constraints, creating a barrier to the
development of accurate computer vision-based models. With
such restrictions in place, the development of accurate machine
learning classifiers for CSAM identification based on file meta-
data becomes crucial.
In this work, we propose a system for CSAM identification on
file storage systems based solely on metadata - file paths. Our
aim is to provide a tool that is material type agnostic (image,
video, PDF), and can potentially scans thousands of file storage
systems in a short time. Our approach uses convolutional neural
networks, and achieves an accuracy of 97% and recall of 94%.
Additionally, we address the potential problem of offenders trying
to evade detection by this model by evaluating the robustness of
our model against adversarial modifications in the file paths.
Index Terms—child sexual abuse medias; child exploitation;
CSAM; file path; file storage systems; cloud storage; machine
learning; neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNATIONAL law enforcement handle millions ofchild sexual abuse cases annually. Hotlines internationally
have received and reviewed over 37 million child sexual abuse
files in 2017, alone [5]. Despite the 2008 Protect our children
act [20], the numbers of CSAM in digital platforms have
dramatically grown in the last decade[30]. Online sharing plat-
forms have facilitated[24] the explosive growth of CSAM cre-
ation and distribution [6]. Every platform for content searching
and sharing, including social material, likely has CSAM on it
[15]. This is an issue that affects society in larger numbers than
expected. Recent studies reported alarming statistics, where
25% of girls and 17% of boys in the U.S. will experience
some form of sexual abuse before the age of 18 [27].
As the scale of the problem grew, technology became
essential in CSAM identification. Technology giants such as
Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, and Google have made detection
and removal of CSAM one of their top concerns, and work
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with non-profits such as Project VIC International 1, Thorn 2
and the Internet Watch Foundation3 to create tools to combat
CSAM proliferation.
With the COVID-19 pandemic, experts have observed that
the distribution of CSAM in social material and video con-
ference apps has significantly increased [25]. Distributors use
coded language to trade links of CSAM hosted in plain sight
on content sharing platforms such as Facebook, YouTube,
Twitter, and Instagram using cryptic language to evade the
current detection tools [6], [25].
A. Preventing Distribution of Undiscovered Material.
The identification of CSAM is an extremely challenging
problem. It starts with the fact that it can manifest in different
types of material: images, videos, streaming, video conference,
online gaming, among others. CSAM still undiscovered and
unlabeled on the internet is potentially several magnitudes
greater than previously identified CSAM. New material is
created daily and digital platforms have a large role to play in
the detection and and removal of this material.
Multiple approaches to the CSAM identification problem
using computer vision-based methods have appeared in the
literature in the past years [28], [16], [32]. Although these
approaches appear promising, they lack evaluation in real-
world big data unbalanced data sets; data sets with ethnicity
diversity, and time efficiency and scalability evaluation. To
keep up with all new forms of CSAM content distribution [6],
all these factors must be carefully evaluated and taken into
consideration.
B. Our Contributions
Given the complexity of the problem of detecting CSAM, it
is essential to analyze different aspects of the CSAM distribu-
tion. This paper proposes statistical models that compute the
likelihood that a file path is associated with a CSAM file. An
advantage of this approach is that it does not require posses-
sion of the raw CSA image or video for training machine
learning models. Specifically, we accomplish the following
tasks:
• Train and compare several machine-learning based mod-
els that analyze metadata from file storage systems and
determine a probability that a given file has child sexual
abuse content.
1https://www.projectvic.org
2https://www.thorn.org
3https://www.iwf.org.uk
2• Analyze the robustness of our models against commonly
used techniques for avoiding detection in text-based ma-
chine learning classifiers. We study the resilience of our
models against black-box attackers (attackers that have
no knowledge of the models and their parameters) and
against attackers that have knowledge about words that
have a high probability to appear in CSAM file paths.
• We train our models on a real-world data set containing
over one million file paths. It is the largest file path data
set ever used for CSAM detection to date. Our classifiers
achieve recall rates over 94% and accuracy over 97%.
Our results demonstrate, for the first time, the practicality
of using file paths for CSAM detection in storage systems.
II. RELATED WORK
A. PhotoDNA Hash
Identification of CSAM via statistical algorithms is a fairly
recent approach. At the turn of the century, laws targeting
online exploitation were introduced and refined (COPA in the
US, Crime and Disorder Act UK)[7], but the first widely
used methodology was released in 2008. Known widely as
PhotoDNA[17], the technology was developed by Dr. Hany
Farid and Microsoft.
In PhotoDNA, an image is converted to a long string of
characters by a fuzzy hash algorithm, and this hash could
then be compared against other hashes to find identical or
similar images without people having to view the images
and compromising the victim’s identity. This system is still
one of the most widely used methods for detecting images
worldwide, databases of hashed CSAM images are used to
identify identical or similar images on many digital platforms,
including search engines, social networks, and file storage
platforms. The advantage of PhotoDNA Hash is that it has
a low false-positive detection rate, but it has some clear
drawbacks. It only works on known CSAM that has gone
through its hashing algorithm, and identification of new CSAM
is still primarily a manual labeling endeavor. Labelers have to
be trained and wellness programs have to be developed to
counter the psychological impact of viewing these images.
B. Machine Learning for Image Identification
Since PhotoDNA’s first development, computer vision mod-
els have undergone a revolution resulting in novel machine
learning based models for pornography and CSAM detection
[19], [16], [32], [22]. The current approaches either combine a
computer vision model to extract image descriptors [28], train
computer vision models on pornography data [9], perform a
combination of age estimation and pornography detection [16]
or synthetic data [32]. However, due to legal restrictions in
maintaining a database of CSAM images, all current works
are based on either unrealistic images [32], or validated by
authorities in very small [28], [16], [9] data sets that hardly
represents the true data distribution in the internet [6].
C. Machine Learning Based on Complementary Signals and
Metadata
While significant efforts have focused on the images them-
selves, some researchers have looked for complementary
signals and metadata that could help in CSAM identifica-
tion. For example, queries that bring up CSAM in search
engines, or conversations that imply grooming or trade in
CSAM[26]. Other efforts have used textual signals to identify
where CSAM might be located, such as keywords related
to website content[29], using NLP analysis[23], [21], [2],
conversations[4]. Our work falls into this category.
D. File Path classification
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a single paper
that describes an attempt to identify CSAM based solely on file
paths [2]. While pioneering, this work was based on a small
data set containing only 9,000 CSAM file paths, and their
best model achieves recall rates lower than 80% for CSAM
file paths. High recall rate is critical for this application.
Additionally, the work in [2] does not address the question
of classifiers robustness against noise introduced at test time
(adversarial attacks).
E. Robustness Against Adversarial Attacks
Whenever a machine learning classifier is used for detecting
malicious behavior or content, it is important to consider
the possibility that inputs to the model have been modified
in an adversarial way. Adversarial inputs to a classifier are
inputs that have been modified in an intentional way to
make detection of malicious activity harder. An adversary can
intentionally flip characters of words that most likely contain
signal for helping in the classification task, e.g. using Lo7ita
instead of Lolita.
Our proposed techniques are based on classification of file
paths. Thus, it is important to study the effects of adversarial
inputs in the classifier performance.
Such a question is not new in natural language processing
and the effect of random modifications to a classifier’s inputs
have been previously studied in the context of text classifica-
tion [1], machine translation [3] and word embedding [11].
In this paper, we study the robustness of our model in
two different situations. One where such an adversary has no
knowledge of model’s parameters [8], or even the score output
generated at test time [12]. We call this a black-box adversary.
Additionally, we also present an analysis where the adver-
sary has some knowledge of the models and uses it to target
regions of the file path that most likely contain signals for
classification.
III. DATA SET DESCRIPTION
Our approach to identifying CSAM file paths is based on
supervised learning. Thus, it is necessary to build a pre-
labelled data set (CSA versus non-CSA). Moreover, we also
need separating the data set according to storage system
precedence. This is done to guarantee independence of samples
in train and test time.
3Our data set was provided by Project VIC International and
consists of 1,010,000 file paths from 55,312 unique storage
systems. The data extraction from all storage systems utilizes
a forensics technique known as file carving. File carving
recovers files by scanning the raw bytes of a storage system
and reassembling them. This process comprises examining the
header (the first few bytes) and footer (the last few bytes) of a
file. File carving is utilized for recovering files and fragments
of files when directory entries are corrupt or missing. Forensics
experts use this in criminal cases for recovering evidence.
Particularly in CSA cases, law enforcement agents can often
recover more images from the suspect’s storage system using
carving techniques.
The data set includes the following columns:
• File path: This column contains the entire file path for
a given file. File paths are strings that contains location
information of a file (folders) in a storage system, as well
as the file name. Examples of file paths in our data set:
C:\Users\SomeUser\Pictures\Seattle.png
D:\ExternalHD\Files \Pictures\Seattle.png
• Label: The data set provided by Project VIC contains 4
different labels to identify the type of content in the file.
The labels are defined as:
[0] Non-pertinent
[1] Child Abuse Material (CSAM)
[2] Child Exploitive/Age Difficult
[3] CGI/Animation Child exploitive
TABLE I
QUANTITY OF FILE PATHS IN EACH LABEL CLASS
Label Number of file paths
0 717,448
1 33,901
2 250,724
3 7,927
Our system aims to identify all classes of CSA-related mate-
rial. For the purposes of model training and model evaluation,
we created binary labels (CSAM vs non-CSAM). Labels 1,2
and 3 are mapped to CSAM (292,552 file paths); label 0 is
mapped to non-CSAM (717,448 file paths).
A. File Path Characteristics
We describe file path characteristics that will help us define
technical aspects of our classification models such as the
size of the character embedding vectors in our deep neural
networks models.
Figure1 shows the distribution of file path lengths in the
data set. Only 4,685 file paths have more than 300 characters.
For this reason, we truncate the file path by discarding the
initial characters and keeping only the last 300 characters for
training, validation and testing.
The majority of the data set presents English terms and
words. Using the language identification library Fasttext [14],
we identified words in over 10 languages, including Russian,
German, Swedish, Spanish, Polish, Italian, Japanese, Chinese
and Portuguese. The variety of languages and alphabets used
Fig. 1. Number of characters in each file path
in the file paths define the size of the character embedding
layer in our models.
B. Cross Validation Data Split
We use a K-Fold Cross Validation methodology in our
experiments with K=10. To guarantee independence of file
paths in the different partitions of the data, we create the
random data folds by splitting the data by storage system
information, as illustrated in Fig 2.
The storage system identification for each file path is done
as follows. We check if the information before the first back-
lash corresponds to external storage system or a laptop/desktop
file system. If we are unable to extract the identifying factors
before the first backlash, we extract the information of the first
two backlashes and use it as the storage system identifier.
IV. FILE PATH-BASED CSAM CLASSIFIERS
We investigated three approaches for CSAM file path clas-
sification.
• The first approach is based on extracting bag-of-words
from the file paths following by a traditional supervised
machine learning classifier (logistic regression, boosted
decision trees, and naive Bayes);
• The second approach is based on computing n-grams
from each file path and presenting these n-gram vectors
to a traditional supervised machine learning classifier
Fig. 2. Data split for K-fold cross validation. The data is partitioned by
storage system ids. File paths from a same storage system are all assigned
to a same data fold. The data folds in the orange shaded areas represent the
training data in each iteration, and the data folds in the blue shaded areas
represent the test data.
4(logistic regression, boosted decision trees, and naive
Bayes);
• The third approach is based on character-based deep
learning models. This approach uses a character quanti-
zation of each file path and presents it to a deep learning
model architecture.
We now describe how the input data (file path) is repre-
sented in each one of these approaches and the deep learning
architectures that were used.
A. Data Input Representation
a) Bag-of-Words and TF-IDF: For each file path, we
consider a “word” to be a sequence of alphanumeric characters
that are separated by a dash, slash, colon, underscore or
period. The bag-of-words model is constructed by selecting
the 5,000 most frequent ”words” from the training subset. For
the standard bag-of-words, we use the counts of each word as
the features. In the TF-IDF (term-frequency inverse-document-
frequency) [13] version, the term-frequency (TF) is the number
of times a term occurs in a given document. The inverse-
document frequency-component (IDF) is computed as:
IDF(t) = log
1 + n
1 + df(t)
+ 1
where n is the total number of documents in the document
set, and df(t) is the number of documents in the document
set that contain term. For each term it is computed the
product of the TF and IDF components. The resulting TF-
IDF vectors are then normalized by the Euclidean norm. The
data set of vectorized file paths is used as input to three
different learning algortihms: logistic regression, naive Bayes
and boosted decision trees.
b) Bag-of-Ngrams and TF-IDF: We extract from each
file path string its n-grams, for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The set of n-
grams of a string s, is the set of all substrings of s of length
n. The bag-of-ngrams models are constructed by selecting
the 50,000 most frequent n-grams (up to 3-grams) from the
training subset for each data set. The feature values are
computed the same way as in the bag-of-words model. The
data set of vectorized file path n-grams is used as input to
three different learning algortihms: logistic regression, naive
Bayes and boosted decision trees.
c) Character-Based Quantization: As input to the deep
neural networks models, we use sequences of encoded charac-
ters. We use the same approach proposed in [33]. An alphabet
of size m is defined as the input language, which is quantized
using 1-of-m encoding. Each file path is then transformed into
a sequence of such m sized vectors with fixed length 300, and
any characters exceeding length 300 is ignored. If the file path
name is shorter than 300, we pad with zeroes on the left. In
our data sets, over 99% of the file paths have length less than
300 characters, as shown in Figure 1.
Characters that are not in the alphabet are quantized as all-
zero vectors. The alphabet used in all of our models consists of
m = 802 characters, which includes English letters, Japanese
characters, Chinese characters, Korean characters and special
alphanumeric characters. The alphabet is the set of all unique
characters in the training data.
All deep neural network architectures start with an embed-
ding layer that learns to represent each character by numerical
vector. The embedding maps semantically similar characters to
similar vectors, where the notion of similarity is automatically
learned based on the classification task at hand.
B. Deep Learning Architectures
Deep Neural Networks in combination with character em-
beddings have succeeded in several short text and string
classification tasks. From natural language text [33] to domain
classification [31], deep neural networks architectures have
outperformed traditional methods in several applications.
In our work, we use two architectures of deep neural
networks: convolutional networks and long-short term memory
networks.
a) Convolutional Neural Networks: Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks (CNN) are known for state-of-the-art advances in
image processing, and apply to inputs of grid-like topology.
One-dimensional CNNs are a natural fit when the input is
text, treated as a raw signal at the character level [33]. CNNs
automatically learn filters to detect patterns that are important
for prediction. The presence (or lack) of these patterns is
then used by the quintessential neural network (multilayer
perceptron, or MLP) to make predictions. These filters, (also
called kernels) are learned during backpropagation. An intu-
itive example in image processing is a filter which detects
vertical edges, while in text processing the filters detect sub-
strings, or n-grams. The underlying operation of CNNs is
elementwise multiplication, performed between each filter and
sub-sections of the input. The resulting values indicate the
degree to which these sub-sections match the filters. In this
manner, the filters are convoluted over the input to form an
activation map, which represents the locations of discovered
features.
b) Long Short-Term Memory Networks: We train an
depp neural network architecture that uses a recurrent neu-
ral network layer, namely long-short term memory (LSTM)
networks. The variant of LSTM used is the common “vanilla”
architecture as used in [31].
LSTM is a type of recurrent neural network that can capture
combinations of letters. This characteristic can be critical to
discriminating CSA file paths from non-CSA file paths. This
flexible architecture generalizes manual feature extraction via
n-grams, for example, but instead learns dependencies of one
or multiple characters, whether in succession or with arbitrary
separation.
The LSTM layer can be thought of as an implicit feature
extraction, as opposed to explicit feature extraction (e.g., n-
grams) used in other approaches. Rather than represent file
paths names explicitly as a bag of n-grams, for example, the
LSTM learns patterns of characters (or in our case, embedded
vectors) that maximize the performance of the second classi-
fication layer.
c) Implementation Details: Figures 3 and 4 show de-
tailed information of both architectures(charCNN and charL-
STM), including data dimensions and the number of weights
in each layer.
5Fig. 3. Diagram of the deep neural network architecture with CNN layers
used for training one of our charCNN model. All data dimensions and number
of weights in each layer of our charCNN model are indicated in the above
diagram.
Fig. 4. Diagram of the deep neural network architecture with LSTM layer
used for training one of our charLSTM model. All data dimensions and
number of weights in each layer of our charLSTM model are indicated in
the above diagram.
V. EVALUATION
We present our results for all our classifiers in Table II.
All performance metrics were measure using a 10-fold cross-
validation methodology. For each of our classifiers, we report
the mean and the standard deviation of the area under the ROC
curve (AUC), accuracy, precision, and recall for predicting
CSAM files. We focus on two primary metrics for model
comparison: Recall and AUC. Additionally, we assess all
machine learning models’ generalization by looking into the
standard deviations over the cross-validation folds.
A. Traditional Machine Learning
There are significant advantages of traditional machine
learning models in comparison with deep neural networks.
Understanding how well these models perform can help sci-
entists and investigators leverage one of such models’ most
remarkable characteristics: feature interpretability. The most
relevant predictive tokens, or n-grams, can give clues about
relevant vocabulary words in the data set and be leveraged
in other CSAM detection systems. On table II, we observe
that the model trained with bag-of-words and bag-of-ngrams
operates in similar AUC and accuracy ranges. When analyzing
recall rates of traditional models, we note that both naive
Bayes models have the highest rates, with the lowest stan-
dard deviation. The naive Bayes with bag-of-ngrams features
presents the best recall of all traditional models, of about 91%.
Among the other models trained using bag-of-ngrams, naive
Bayes presents a much smaller recall standard deviation (σ =
0.085) when compared to logistic regression (σ = 0.20) and
boosted decision trees(σ = 0.20).
In figure 5, we compare side by side the ROC curves of
all the models. The ROC curve illustrates the operation of a
binary classifier as its discrimination thresholds vary. Although
the evaluation of CSAM classification models heavily relies on
recall rates, when deployment a model in an environment that
potentially analyses hundreds on thousands of file systems,
and consequently millions of file paths, precision rates must
be analyzed. The burden of having several thousands of false
positives can result in an inefficient process and potentially
delay investigations and discovery of true positives. By an-
alyzing the traditional models’ ROC curve, we observe that
boosted decision trees overall performs better than the two
other techniques.
B. Deep Neural Networks
We were able to achieve the best performance across all
categories with deep neural network architecture. We trained
two different architectures: our first architecture utilizes CNNs
and the second LSTMs. The LSTM model achieves results
very similar to the bag-of-words naive Bayes classifier. How-
ever, our CNN model consistently outperformed all the other
models, both in mean performance metrics across all folds
and in the smallest standard deviation. The resulting ROC
curve also indicates a model that operates with a higher recall
for multiple ranges of false-positive rates. The recall of over
94% and precision over 93% makes this model an excellent
candidate as an investigative tool in environments with large
volumes of storage systems.
VI. MODEL ROBUSTNESS TO ADVERSARIAL INPUTS
In classical machine learning applications, we assume that
the underlying data distribution is stationary at test time.
However, there are multiple scenarios where an intelligent,
adaptive adversary can actively manipulate samples.
In the scenario of CSAM file path identification, it is easy
to imagine a scenario where perpetrators include typos and
modifications to the file paths to evade vocabulary blacklists
and even machine learning-based CSAM detection mecha-
nisms. We address this problem by simulating attack scenarios
where an adversary actively changes the file paths to elude the
classifiers.
6TABLE II
PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR VARIOUS MODELS
Features Algorithm AUC Accuracy Precision Recall
Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ
Bag of Words Logistic Regression 0.967 0.035 0.922 0.062 0.904 0.090 0.787 0.202
Bag of Words Naive Bayes 0.972 0.011 0.927 0.032 0.875 0.070 0.859 0.114
Bag of Words Boosted Trees 0.982 0.013 0.934 0.062 0.903 0.096 0.827 0.203
Bag of N-grams Logistic Regression 0.980 0.021 0.931 0.060 0.919 0.088 0.793 0.202
Bag of N-grams Naive Bayes 0.958 0.023 0.929 0.032 0.839 0.083 0.913 0.085
Bag of N-grams Boosted Trees 0.983 0.015 0.931 0.060 0.906 0.094 0.822 0.203
Character quantization CNN 0.990 0.011 0.968 0.019 0.938 0.034 0.943 0.060
Character quantization LSTM 0.977 0.029 0.930 0.072 0.862 0.144 0.846 0.213
Fig. 5. ROC curves of all models trained in our experiments. Each subplot shows the roc curves of all models trained in the 10-fold cross validation procedure
for a same machine learning technique.
We present two different flavors of the adversarial attack.
In the first scenario, we consider an adversary that does not
have any knowledge about the CSAM file detection mecha-
nism, or access to its scoring results. The adversary makes
random changes to characters in the file paths. The number of
modifications allowed in the file path is the adversary’s budget.
The determination of an adversary budget is a challenging task
since we want to enable the adversary to make the maximum
amount of changes, without compromising the human com-
prehension of the meaning of the string of characters. Based
on previous results, we believe that this amount lies between
10% and 15% of the length of the file path [12]. To stress-test
our models, we also analyze the performance of our models
under a 20% change.
In the targeted keywords scenario, we consider that the
adversary has access to a vocabulary that is highly correlated
with the CSAM samples in the training set. The adversary
makes targeted character substitutions only on the terms that
are good predictors for each class. The adversary’s goal is
to cause a decrease in the confidence output of the scoring
algorithm and, consequently, result in a wrong label attribution
to a specif file path. In this scenario, the adversary can modify
up to four keywords, one character per keyword.
A. Adversarial Examples
Given a model F : X → Y , which maps the input space X
to the set of labels Y , a valid adversarial example xadv is gen-
erated by altering the original data example x ∈ X and should
conform to the following requirements: F(xadv) 6= F(x) and
S(xadv,x) ≤ ǫ, where S : X × X → R
+ is a similarity
function and ǫ ∈ R+ is a constant modeling the budget
available to the adversary, the total number of modifications
allowed.
B. Threat Model
In our threat model, the attacker is not aware of the model
architecture, parameters and does not have access to the
confidence scores output of the model [10]. In our first setting,
7the only knowledge the adversary has about the model is the
input space X and the output space Y .
In the targeted keywords setting, we assume that the ad-
versary also has some knowledge of the training data. The
training data originates from storage systems confiscated from
perpetrators. In that case, we can assume other malicious
entities have access to similar or identical data and understand
the vocabulary of keywords used to identify the files. We
describe details of the adversary’s knowledge in section VI-D.
C. Adversarial Examples with Random Modifications
The adversarial examples are generated by randomly se-
lecting a position in the file path string, and substituting the
character in the selected position by a random alphanumeric
character. This technique has been previously used to attack
language models [3]. We evaluate our models for an adver-
sarial budget of 10%, 15%, and 20% of file path length. For
example, an adversary with a budget of 10% would modify 3
characters the file path data/10 fold data split/dataset, which
is 31 characters long. A randomly modified file path, with
ǫ=10%, is data/10 f9ld dkta split/datoset.
D. Adversarial Examples with Random Modifications in Tar-
geted Keywords
In our experiments, we assume an adversary has access to
the training data set, and uses the training data to identify
character sequences that are highly correlated to CSAM file
paths.
In this attack, we generate a list of tokens that are highly
correlated with CSAM file paths, and we assume that the
adversary has access to this list. We create the list of highly
correlated tokens using Odds ratio, a widely used technique
in information retrieval, and used for feature selection and
interpretation of text classification models [18].
To generate this list, the first step of the attack is to identify
which tokens are more likely to appear in CSAM file paths. We
extract all tokens from the data set of file paths as described
in section IV-A. For all keywords, we calculate the odds of
the keyword being part of a CSAM file path and the odds of
the keyword being part of a non-CSAM file path. The Odds
ratio of a keyword k is defined as ORk, and is computed as:
ORk =
odds of k appear in CSAM file
odds of k appear in non-CSAM
The list of CSA keywords, Tcsa, comprises all keywords with
Odds ratio greater than two. We make this list available to the
adversary. We rank the keywords by Odds ratio and make the
ranking available to the adversarial as well.
To create an adversarial example from an existing file path
f , the adversary generates Kcsa = Tcsa
⋂
Tf , where Tf is the
set of tokens of f . The file path modification occurs as follows:
The adversary selects the word k ∈ Kcsa with the highest
ranking. The adversary randomly modifies one character in k
by randomly selecting a position in the keyword string, and
substituting the character in the selected position by a random
alphanumeric character. We denote by kˆ the keyword with one
randomly modified character. The adversary replaces k with kˆ
in the file path f . The adversary repeats this procedure for the
next highest ranked keyword in the set Kcsa. The number of
allowed keyword replacements is determined by the budget ǫ.
E. Evaluation under adversarial examples
We evaluate the impact of adversarial modifications in
test samples in the model’s performance. We are especially
interested in understanding which machine learning techniques
are more robust when the data is adversarially modified at test
time. All attacks target only CSAM file paths, and therefore
we only evaluate the variation in recall rates. Additionally,
we analyze the mean deviation in confidence scores for all
models.
a) Random Modifications: Under this scenario, an ad-
versary randomly modifies a percentage of the file path by
randomly selecting characters and replacing them with random
characters. A reasonable adversary budget in this scenario is
between 10 % and 15%. Previous works have also consid-
ered this percentage range for perturbing text strings [12].
Considering that most file paths have a length between 40
and 200 characters, this results in changing between 6 and 30
characters in each file path. To stress-test our models, we also
analyze the performance of our models under a 20% change.
Table III shows details on the confidence score variations
for different adversarial budgets.
Figure 6 demonstrates the variation in recall rates as the
percentage of random flipped characters increases. For an
adversarial budget of 15%, we observe a decrease in recall
rates of 0.02 for bag-of-words and naive Bayes and 0.07 in the
CNN model. Interestingly, bag-of-ngrams naive Bayes suffers
an increase in recall rates after flipping a percentage of the
characters in the file path. This phenomenon results from the
fact that modifications in the file paths can also increase the
model’s confidence score output. The boosted decision trees
models undergo the most significant decrease in recall rates.
A possible model overfitting can explain this to this specific
data set distribution. In the case of 20% of flipped characters,
the deep neural networks models’ recall rates decrease ≈ 0.1,
and bag-of-words naive Bayes decreases ≈ 0.05, and bag-of-
Fig. 6. Recall decrease as adversary budget increases in black box setting
for different models.
8TABLE III
MODEL ROBUSTNESS TO ADVERSARIAL RANDOM MODIFICATIONS WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ADVERSARIAL BUDGET: 10%, 15% AND 20%
Features Algorithm Budget: 10% Budget: 15% Budget: 20%
Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ
Bag of Words Logistic Regression 0.05 0.19 0.09 0.24 0.13 0.28
Bag of Words Naive Bayes ≈0 0.25 0.03 0.29 0.07 0.32
Bag of Words Boosted Trees 0.16 0.35 0.26 0.40 0.35 0.40
Bag of N-grams Logistic Regression 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.15
Bag of N-grams Naive Bayes -0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.2 -0.02 0.21
Bag of N-grams Boosted Trees 0.12 0.30 0.19 0.35 0.26 0.38
Character quantization CNN 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.22
Character quantization LSTM 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.27 0.13 0.31
TABLE IV
MODEL ROBUSTNESS TO ADVERSARIAL TARGETED KEYWORDS MODIFICATIONS WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ADVERSARIAL BUDGET: 1 ,2,3 AND 4
WORDS IN THE FILE PATH
Features Algorithm Budget: 1 Budget: 2 Budget: 3 Budget: 4
Mean σ e Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ
Bag of Words Logistic Regression 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06
Bag of Words Naive Bayes ≈0 0.05 ≈0 0.06 ≈0 0.07 ≈0 0.07
Bag of Words Boosted Trees 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.09
Bag of N-grams Logistic Regression 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Bag of N-grams Naive Bayes ≈0 0.05 ≈0 0.06 ≈0 0.06 ≈0 0.07
Bag of N-grams Boosted Trees ≈0 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07
Character quantization CNN ≈0 0.02 ≈0 0.03 ≈0 0.03 ≈0 0.04
Character quantization LSTM ≈0 0.04 ≈0 0.05 ≈0 0.05 ≈0 0.06
Fig. 7. Recall decrease as adversary budget increases in white box setting
for different models.
ngrams naive Bayes, once again presents an increase in its
recall rate.
b) Targeted Keywords: Having access to a list of highly
correlated keywords with CSAM file paths, Tcsa, will permit
the adversary to make targeted changes in the CSAM file
paths. This experiment allows the adversary to change one
character per keywords, up to 4 keywords per file path. The
recall variation as a function of the adversarial budget is
illustrated in figure 7.
As indicated in figure 7, the most significant drop in
accuracy happens for budget = 1. This is justified by the
fact that the adversary also has access to the Odds ratio for
each keyword. For budget = 1, the adversary will modify
the keyword with the largest Odds ratio; for budget = 2, the
adversary will modify the keywords with the two largest Odds
ratio, and so on.
Overall, the targeted changes in the file paths result in small
changes in the recall rates. Logistic regression and boosted
decision trees have more considerable recall variations than
naive Bayes and deep neural networks models.
Confidence score variation details are described in table IV.
It is easy to observe that the mean change in confidence score
in less than 0.1 for all models and all budgets. However, we see
examples in our experiments where a single change resulted
in a drastic drop in the confidence score.
We conclude that, without access to the model output, it
is hard to craft an adversarial example close to the original
sample, even when an adversary has access to a list of
keywords highly correlated with the positive class.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a system for CSAM identification
based solely on file paths. CSAM identification systems based
on file paths have the advantage of not working directly
with CSA photos or videos, thus providing a a classifier
that is medium agnostic, of easy maintenance and reduced
legal restrictions for acquiring and using a data set. To the
best of our knowledge, our classifier is the first of the kind
to achieve precision and recall rates over 90%, making an
ideal candidate for deployment in investigations and detection
of CSAM content in file storage systems. Our results have
been evaluated with a data set consisting of over one million
entries obtained from real investigations all over the world.
Our experiments show that our proposed models generalize
well to identifying CSAM content in file storage systems and
are robust to some adversarial attacks introduced at test time.
We believe that this method, along with PhotoDNA hash,
computer vision tools, and other forensics tools, should form
part of a global toolset that enables organizations to fight the
distribution of CSAM. Its purpose is to be a fast identifier
9that allows investigation agencies and technology companies
to find images and videos in file storage systems quickly. This
speed in detection can potentially reduce repeated victimiza-
tion of abused children.
Online child sexual abuse imagery falls into a category
of images that should not be distributed or be present in
file storage systems. Although this is a complex problem to
solve given the distributed nature of the internet, automated
tools and machine learning-based systems can help technology
companies and investigation agencies rapidly identify and take
the appropriate actions.
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